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Abstract
User perceived quality is the most important aspect of
Internet applications. After a single negative experience,
users tend to switch to one of the other myriad of alterna
tives available to them on the Internet. Two key compon
ents of Internet application quality are scalability and reli
ability. In this paper, we present the ﬁrst general-purpose
mechanism capable of maintaining reliability in the face
of process, machine, and catastrophic failures. We deﬁne
catastrophic failures as events that cause entire clusters of
servers to become unavailable such as network partition
ing, router failures, natural disasters, or even terrorist at
tacks. Our mechanism utilizes client-side tunneling, clientside redirection, and implicit redirection triggers to deliver
reliable communication channels. We capitalize on previ
ous work, Redirectable Sockets (RedSocks), that focuses on
Internet application scalability. RedSocks are communica
tion channels enhanced with a novel session layer aimed
at modernizing network communication. We modify RedSocks to create the ﬁrst fault tolerant socket solution that
can handle all server-side failures. Our mechanism is com
patible with NATs and Firewalls, scalable, application in
dependent, and backwards compatible.

1 Introduction
It is crucial for Internet applications to be available 24-7.
One study found that two-thirds of Internet users will rarely
return to a site after a single bad experience [10]. Bhatti et
al. [2] state, “Users have too many web sites that they can
use as alternatives if they are either refused entry to one site
or are given particulary slow service.” For some popular
web services, a single server failure can result in tens of
thousands of lost customers.
To achieve 24/7 availability, Internet applications need
to be scalable and reliable. The most popular solution to
scalability is to construct multiple clusters of commodity
servers and route incoming requests to them via a mechan-
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ism such as DNS Round Robin [3] or URL-rewriting [8].
L4 or L7 switches are then used for intracluster load bal
ancing. No standard solution exists for making Internet ap
plications reliable, but researchers have proposed a number
of ideas [1, 12, 13, 9]. One reason for the lack of a standard
solution for reliability is the tension that exists between re
liability and scalability. Scalable systems are more complex
or introduce central failure points which increases the vul
nerability of the server system. At the same time, overly
cautious failover mechanisms directly affect system scala
bility by increasing server response latency.
Current approaches to Internet application reliability fall
into two categories. The ﬁrst category, connection redirec
tion, insures new connections reach a healthy server. Both
DNS and network switches, such as Cisco’s LocalDirec
tor [4], can be conﬁgured to incorporate server health infor
mation in their connection routing. Connection redirection
complements the second category, communication fault tol
erance. The goal here is to allow existing communication
channels to persist in the face of machine failure. Most so
lutions use primary-backup or log-based recovery.
However, no solution addresses catastrophic failures.
We deﬁne catastrophic failures as failures that completely
block all communication from the current server cluster to
the client. These failures can result from accidently cut
transmission lines, router hardware failures, natural disas
ters, or even terrorist attacks. After a catastrophic failure,
only the client and a route to an alternate server cluster ex
ists. From this, the existing communication channel must
be reconnected to an alternate cluster and all communica
tion state and associated application state reconstructed.
We deﬁne a fault tolerant socket as a communication
channel between two applications, typically a client and a
server, that persists in the face of a process, machine, or
catastrophic failure. In Figure 1, we illustrate where failures
can occur along a communication channel and put them into
two categories: server-side and client-side. Attempts in in
creasing server application reliability often target process
(A) and machine (B) failures. Using a redundant router
handles an error at the entry point (D) to the Internet ap-

plication. Cut cables or earthquakes are examples of events
that can cause the complete failure of server clusters (C) and
associated entry points (D). There are two types of failures
that occur in the Internet outside the server’s administra
tive domain. The ﬁrst are errors that can be circumvented
via normal IP routing recovery (E). The second (F) occurs
when there is no alternative path from the client to the origin
server cluster. We categorize failures at points A through F
as server-side errors. Fault tolerant sockets must handle all
server-side failures. Client-side failures (H, I, and J in Fig
ure 1) are beyond the scope of Internet server applications.
Put another way, fault tolerant sockets persist as long as the
client does.
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tion. We developed RedSocks which uses our session-layer
protocol, the Endpoint Operation Protocol (EOP), that al
lows a server to redirect connections in a ﬂexible, scalable,
and application independent way. In this paper, we augment
EOP to allow RedSocks to provide communication fault
tolerance. Our solution is client transparent, compatible
with NAT’s and Firewalls, backwards compatible with nor
mal sockets, application independent, handles catastrophic
failures, and works with high-performance Internet appli
cations.
In Section 2, we present our fault tolerant socket solu
tion. We follow with a discussion on the details of our im
plementation. We present experiments, in Section 4, that
demonstrate the efﬁcacy of fault tolerant RedSocks. We
conclude with a presentation of related work and some part
ing thoughts.
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Figure 1. Various failure points along a
client/server communication channel.

To handle server-side errors, a failover mechanism must
be able to detect that a failure occured, recover in-ﬂight
data, construct a new communication channel to an oper
ational server, and provide a method to synchronize com
munication and application state. It must do this in a scal
able way to be practical. Last, it must be compatible with
methods for handling new connection redirection and be ap
plication independent.
One way to implement fault tolerant sockets is to use
an existing intra-cluster mechanism and make it an intercluster mechanism. This involves relaying network packets
between clusters for every network packet received from a
client. This transaction must complete before responding to
the client. This exasperates the scalability problem. With
this type of solution, you minimally double the amount of
trafﬁc seen in individual clusters and increase the server re
sponse time by the roundtrip latency between clusters. We
do not explore this method.
In this paper, we present our implementation of fault tol
erant sockets. We propose a method that relies on clientside support. Client-side support consists of a redirec
tion mechanism (client-side redirection), a method to detect
communication channel errors to trigger redirection (im
plicit redirection triggers), and data synchronization (clientside tunnelling). We ﬁrst introduced the idea of client-side
support in [7] where we applied it to connection redirec

We have extended BSD sockets with our session layer
protocol, EOP, that generates redirection events and en
ables endpoint redeﬁnition. We call such sockets Redi
rectable sockets or RedSocks. We looked at explicit redi
rection events in [6] to increase the scalability of internet
applications. We now look at RedSocks and implicit redi
rection events to construct fault tolerant sockets.

2.1 Failover Semantics
We describe the semantics of redirection in RedSocks
through a simple example. As shown in Figure 2(a), a com
munication channel exists between two nodes, A and B .
An error at B generates an implicit redirection event that
changes the “B” endpoint of the channel to C (see Fig
ure 2(b)). C represents a node that may equal A, B or a
completely different node. EOP responds to the implicit
redirection event by creating a new channel between A and
C , synchronizing application and communication state, and
removing the channel between A and B as seen in Fig
ure 2(c). In Figure 2, a lower-case letter in a box represents
A
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Figure 3. Implicit Redirection Event Timeline
a request and the corresponding upper-case letter represents
the response to that request.

2.2 Implicit Redirection Events
Implicit redirection events are generated by errors on the
communication channel and serve as triggers for failover.
Detecting these errors is not trivial and is explained in Sec
tion 3. Implicit redirection is enabled and conditioned via
the setsockopt system call. We deﬁne three new EOP
socket options — heartbeat, checkpoint, and failover list.
The EOP heartbeat option starts a heartbeat mechanism, at a
rate determined by the server, on the client side of the com
munication channel. The heartbeat mechanism is necessary
for detecting host failure or network partitioning, because
normal TCP detection of these errors typically takes well
over twenty minutes. The EOP checkpoint option buffers
server application state at the client and is used to update
the alternate server to which the client is directed. Alter
nate servers are provided to the client-side EOP by the EOP
failover list option. No failover can occur until this option is
set by the server. The last component that enables implicit
redirection is that the client side EOP layer buffers the last
data sent and can resend this data, if necessary, to handle
in-ﬂight data.
Our form of failover has several appealing properties.
First, our mechanism depends only on communication

channel feedback, i.e. TCP errors, and eliminates the need
for 3rd party health monitors prevalent in other solutions.
Second, the mechanism directly handles state transfer and
synchronization. Other solutions, see Section 5, often in
volve dedicated backup servers or complex communication
channel taps that constantly record packet trafﬁc. Finally,
by buffering data at the client and being able to redirect
across a WAN, ours is the only solution that handles catas
trophic failures.
Figure 3 provides a system call level view of host interac
tions for the different implicit redirection cases. In Figure 3,
a lowercase letter denotes a request, an uppercase letter de
notes a reply, a rounded box represents EOP processing that
is transparent to the client, and 0 indicates a null parameter.
In addition, we use
to denote the fault tolerant list op
tion,
to denote the heartbeat option, and
to denote
the checkpointing option. The
option is shaded in the
ﬁgure. If used, then the jagged line in the ﬁgure represents
both process failures and network partitioning. Otherwise,
it only represents process failures.
Figure 3(a) gives the case where the server is not us
ing the checkpoint option and the error is detected during
a send system call at the client. Server 1 must set the
socket option before accepting the connection. If the server
does not, the connection will be vulnerable to errors until
the option is set. The server can also set the
socket

option at any time in order to update the list of alternate
servers. This list, along with all other option settings, is
passed to the client during the EOP handshake (see Sec
tion 3). The client-side EOP is notiﬁed of a communication
channel error via TCP error codes or the heartbeat option. It
then picks an alternate server from the failover list, creates a
new connection to this server, forwards the previous request
y to Server 2, and then returns control to the client. Normal
communication ensues.
Figure 3(b) only differs from Figure 3(a) in that checkpointing is used. Server 1 updates the checkpointed state as
needed. This state usually reﬂects application layer state as
sociated with serving requests on the communication chan
nel, such as a ﬁle name and offset. The checkpointed state
is buffered at the client as part of the session layer commu
nication state and overwritten on each update. The error de
tection and redirection at the client occur as before, except
that the checkpointed data is forwarded to Server 2 arriv
ing in an accept st parameter. The client again forwards
the last request. Server 2 sends a reply to this request and
continues to serve any additional requests.
Figures 3(c) and 3(d) are the recv error counterparts
of Figures 3(a) and 3(b), respectively. While the client
is blocked in the recv system call, EOP detects the er
ror, creates a communication channel to an alternate server,
forwards the previous request, forwards any checkpointed
data, and then continues to wait for a reply. The client has
the capability to set an EOP socket option that will return
an EREDO error instead of automatically buffering and for
warding the previous request at failover. This allows for
more control when the client is EOP-aware.
The servers need to carefully handle data synchroniza
tion in persistent storage with implicit redirection. For ex
ample, in Figure 3(d) Server 1 could have accomplished
various levels of processing on the client’s request before
failing. If this processing entails updating a persistent store,
Server 2 might repeat updates to this store causing data
corruption. If such updates are possible, then the servers
could commit updates after the request/response transac
tions completes, have a rollback mechanism invoked when
servers fail, or have a 3rd party mechanism to record the
partial processing done that Server 2 can query.

3 Implementation
There are several different, complimentary strategies for
implementing RedSocks. You can use a library, proxy, ses
sion layer solution, or RedSocks can be directly incorpo
rated into the application. In our implementation, we chose
a session layer solution and include a TCP option to dis
cover the protocol, so that it can be deployed incremen
tally. Thus, machines can begin aggressively incorporating
RedSocks and its functionality can be incrementally used as
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Figure 4. The architecture for EOP and RedSocks
peers follow suit.

3.1 Environment
We built our fault tolerant sockets in the Linux 2.4.16
kernel, which implements BSD sockets that conform to ver
sion 4.4BSD. All code is written in C and the kernel was
compiled with egcs-2.91.66.

3.2 Architecture
The fault tolerant socket architecture, shown in Figure 4,
is an extension of the architecture we used for RedSocks [7].
We discuss the EOP and transport layer changes necessary
to implement our fault tolerant sockets.
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3.2.1 Endpoint Operation Protocol
We modiﬁed the EOP header to allow options. We use the
header options to send the backup server list, heartbeat rate,
and checkpointed application data necessary for our fault
tolerant socket implementation. The new EOP header is
given in Figure 5. The additional ﬁeld hlen is a 8-bit ﬁeld
that provides the length of the EOP header plus the options.
Figure 6 illustrates the general EOP option format and the
speciﬁc format for sending a backup server list.
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Implicit Redirection Time Flow Diagram Figure 7
gives the time ﬂow diagram for an implicit redirection event
that includes checkpointed state. B periodically check
points its application data during normal communication
with A. When B fails, EOP receives communication chan
nel feedback indicating an error which triggers redirection.
First, EOP chooses an alternate server from the list provided
at connection time1 , connects to it, provides the checkpointed data during the 2-way EOP handshake, and for
wards the previous request. Communication between A and
C proceeds normally.
Endpoint Failure Detection On the client, the failure of
the server-side endpoint is only detectable through errors
reported by the transport layer. The EOP layer must capture
all relevant error codes to know when to invoke the failover
mechanism. The failure mechanism is essentially the RedSocks redirect function with two differences: The redirect
function is invoked by error handling code on the client, not
by a ”redirect” EOP header sent by the server, and its target
is selected from the client’s backup server list, rather than
being pulled from an EOP header.
Table 1 depicts ﬁve different failure scenarios. It pro
vides the type of error that is reported to the application,
TCP’s response, and the fault tolerant action that should be
taken for both process and machine failure for each sce
nario. For network partition failures that separate interme
diate routers, we rely on feedback from ICMP messages.
Scenario I describes the errors that can occur during the
ﬁrst connection attempt by the client. If an error occurs
at this time, there is no failover action to be taken by the
client. In other words, fault tolerance does not apply until a
connection is established.
Scenario II, which represents failures that occur during
a client send, has two subclasses deﬁned for process fail
1 The use of the option that provides a alternate server list is not shown
in the diagram

ure. When the server process fails, the server-side kernel
responds with a partial close of its end of the socket. The
client still sends its message and the receipt of that message
generates a TCP reset, denoted RST in the table, from the
server-side TCP. If the RST arrives before the client calls
recv, then we get case (a) in the table: the error is detected
and the failover operation should be invoked. If the RST
arrives after the client calls recv, then the client can only
detect the sending of FIN which causes the recv call to re
turn with zero bytes read. From the point-of-view of the
client, this seems like a normal EOF occurring in the socket
stream. To distinguish between these cases, we added an
ENDTOKEN that the server sends, in the EOP header, on a
normal close. If client receives a FIN but no ENDTOKEN,
then the client knows it encountered a failure and should fail
over. When the server-side machine fails during scenario
II, the client encounters an extremely long ACK timeout 2 .
This delay is not transparent to the client and another solu
tion is required to detect this condition. Our solution is to
have EOP periodically send heartbeat messages.
In scenario III, process failures are immediately detected
and the client fails over. With machine failure, scenario III
poses a more serious problem. No error conditions are gen
erated and the client will block on the recv system call in
deﬁnitely. Again, we require a heartbeat mechanism to han
dle this situation.
Last, scenario IV is the connection that occurs during the
failover operation. When errors are detected the client tries
the next server in the backup server list. If every server on
the list is down, then the socket terminates and reports the
error to the client.

3.3 Deployability
We enhanced our fault tolerant socket implementation
by adding a negotiation mechanism that allows both end
points to discover socket functionality. At connection-time,
each end-point checks its peer and discovers whether EOP
is supported and adjusts accordingly. We accomplished this
by adding a new TCP option that sends the “conditioning”
of the socket during the TCP 3-way handshake needed to
form a connection. If no option arrives during the hand
shake, then the remote end is not enabled with our enhanced
socket features. Since TCP ignores all unknown options, the
impact of sending this option to systems that do not support
it is negligible.
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Table 1. TCP error messages and responses for given server failure scenarios with desired fault
tolerant socket behavior.

Figure 8 shows the format for this option. The kind ﬁeld
identiﬁes the option. The length ﬁeld equals the total length
of the option, which is four bytes in this case. The last two
bytes comprise a bitmask indicating what features are sup
ported. At this time, we only have one feature — EOP en
abled (E).

4 Experiments
We ﬁrst measured the overhead of using our fault toler
ant sockets when no failure occurs using two 400Mhz dualprocessor Pentium III machines. We measured the normal
communication exchange between our custom client/server
applications with our heartbeat mechanism enabled for dif
ferent sizes of data to checkpoint. The checkpointing
scheme we employ is to checkpoint application state before
every send system call. This simulates the situation where
every request is for a ﬁle to download which typically oc
curs in ftp and web servers. We show the client latency for
reply/request exhanges, varying in size from 100 bytes to
32K, in Figure 9(a). To serve as a basis for comparison, we
include the results for communication with heartbeats and
checkpointing turned off; the line labeled “Normal” repre
sents these results. As Figure 9(a) clearly shows, heartbeats
and checkpointing add minimal overhead.
For our failover overhead measurements, we used three
400Mhz dual-processor Pentium III machines. The server
provides the client with a list of alternate servers to failover
to when the client connects via the EOP handshake. At
some random point in the communication with the client,
the server aborts the connection. When the client-side EOP
detects the failure, it selects an alternate server from the
failover list provided by the original server and opens a con
nection to it. During the EOP handshake, the client-side
EOP provides the alternate server-side EOP with the checkpointed data, the number of bytes read since the check-

pointed data arrived, and any data leftover in the client’s
send buffer. This information is passed up to the alternate
The alternate
server via the accept st system call.
server parses this data and continues to serve the request.
The entire transaction is transparent to the client.
Figure 9(b) shows our results for this scenario for differ
ent simulated ﬁle sizes and checkpoint data size. Again,
we include the results of communication without failure,
heartbeats or checkpointing for comparison; these results
are represented by the line labeled “Normal” in the graph.
We wanted to study the impact of failure on both large and
small ﬁles. To simulate a large ﬁle transfer, we performed
100 hundred send/recv exhanges of the sizes indicated
by the x-axis of Figure 9(b). Simarly, we simulated a small
ﬁle with 5 such exchanges. For a large ﬁles, the time as
sociated with failover is amortized across 100 send/recv
exhanges and thus exhibits less overhead than that experi
enced by small ﬁles.

5 Related Work
Fault Tolerant RedSocks is the only applicationindependent solution that handles catastrophic failures. We
brieﬂy describe application-independent approaches that
handle other server-side failures and place our work within
the context of these approaches.
The Stream Control Transport Protocol [5] proposes the
notion of multi-homing, in which an end-point can be asso
ciated with multiple IP-addresses. Upon a network failure,
the protocol arranges for data to be sent over to an alternate
network path to the same server endpoint. Our mechanism
also handles network failure by allowing failover to an al
ternate network path between the same server endpoint or a
different one.
HydraNet-FT [11] uses a redirector for detecting fail
ures and re-mapping an existing connection to a secondary

one of the servers to resume connection. Because the server
resumes communication, the solution is not compatible with
NATs or Firewalls. Our approach differs from [12] in that
our notion of connection failover is client-centric. Once a
connection fails, a client endpoint determines the server to
which it should re-connect. This makes our approach com
patible with both NATs and ﬁrewalls.
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Fault tolerant RedSocks bring reliability to Internet Ap
plications. Ours is the ﬁrst, general-purpose solution that
handles all server-side failures, including catastrophic fail
ures, in a scalable manner. In future work, we plan to in
corporate connection redirection, instream redirection, and
fault tolerance to provide a single solution to Internet appli
cation scalability and reliability requirements.
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server. The redirector is aware of all replicas, and redirects
each client request to a primary and all its replicas. The
system, thus, uses a primary-backup scheme. Our approach
does not require dedicated replicas.
Alvisi et. al [1] describe a fault tolerant TCP (FT-TCP)
in which a failed TCP connection can be restored to a spe
ciﬁc communication state after a server recovers from fail
ure. FT-TCP is implemented by a wrapper that checkpoints
connection state and data at a separate logger. During the
recovery process, the wrapper and the loggers interact to
bring the application to a speciﬁc state. Our recovery pro
cess does not require servers to replay all previous commu
nication events to rebuild communication and application
state.
Snoeren et. al [12] propose a connection failover me
chanism to provide fault tolerance for a collection of Inter
net servers. In this approach, each connection is associated
with a set of LAN-connected servers. The servers periodi
cally synchronize their connection states. Upon failure, the
servers in the group contact the client, which then selects
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